Decision Theory with a Human Face
豆瓣
简介
When making decisions, people naturally face uncertainty about the potential consequences of their actions due in part to limits in their capacity to represent, evaluate or deliberate. Nonetheless, they aim to make the best decisions possible. In Decision Theory with a Human Face, Richard Bradley develops new theories of agency and rational decision-making, offering guidance on how 'real' agents who are aware of their bounds should represent the uncertainty they face, how they should revise their opinions as a result of experience and how they should make decisions when lacking full awareness of, or precise opinions on relevant contingencies. He engages with the strengths and flaws of Bayesian reasoning, and presents clear and comprehensive explorations of key issues in decision theory, from belief and desire to semantics and learning. His book draws on philosophy, economics, decision science and psychology, and will appeal to readers in all of these disciplines.
Presents a comprehensive treatment of rational decision-making in situations of severe factual and evaluative uncertainty, and develops a unified theory of rational bounded agency
Provides researchers in different fields - philosophy, economics, psychology - with a coherent conceptual framework within which to investigate key issues
Includes clear and detailed presentation of formal and conceptual philosophical material, enabling readers to develop an advanced understanding of the latest research
目录
List of figures
List of tables
Preface
Introduction
Part I. Rationality, Uncertainty and Choice:
1. Decision problems
2. Rationality
3. Uncertainty
4. Justifying Bayesianism
Part II. Prospective Rationality:
5. Rational belief and desire
6. Conditional attitudes
7. Conditionals and the Ramsey Test
Part III. Facing the World:
8. Multidimensional possible world semantics
9. Taking action
10. The learning agent
Part IV. Rationality Within Bounds:
11. Imprecise Bayesianism
12. Changing your mind
13. Decision making under severe uncertainty
14. Confidence
Bibliography
Index.